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DOES HOSPITAL COMPETITION SAVE LIVES? EVIDENCE
FROM THE ENGLISH NHS PATIENT CHOICE REFORMS*
Zack Cooper, Stephen Gibbons, Simon Jones and Alistair McGuire
Recent substantive reforms to the English National Health Service expanded patient choice and
encouraged hospitals to compete within a market with fixed prices. This study investigates whether
these reforms led to improvements in hospital quality. We use a difference-in-difference-style esti-
mator to test whether hospital quality (measured using mortality from acute myocardial infarction)
improved more quickly in more competitive markets after these reforms came into force in 2006. We
find that after the reforms were implemented, mortality fell (i.e. quality improved) for patients living
in more competitive markets. Our results suggest that hospital competition can lead to improve-
ments in hospital quality.
Across the developed world, health care spending accounts for a large and growing
share of most countries gross domestic product (GDP).1 In an effort to slow the rate of
spending growth and improve health system performance, a number of countries have
enacted market-based health care reforms that have centred on increasing user choice
and promoting competition between health care providers.2 These reforms have been
primarily designed to create financial incentives in a sector that has typically been more
state-directed and centrally controlled than others. However, there is not a consensus
on how health care markets should be structured and the evidence on the impact of
choice and competition on clinical quality is inconclusive (Dranove and Satterthwaite,
1992, 2000; Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Sage et al., 2003; Gaynor, 2004). This article
evaluates one recent set of market-based health reforms introduced in the English
National Health Service (NHS) from 2002 to 2008, which focused on introducing
patient choice and provider competition. We take advantage of the explicit introduc-
tion of choice and competition into the NHS in 2006 to create a quasi-natural experi-
ment where we can examine whether greater exposure to competition prompted
hospitals to improve their performance.
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The recent English NHS reforms had three central elements (Department of Health,
2003). First, patients were given the ability to select the hospital they attend for surgery
and the government provided publicly assessable information on provider quality to
inform patients choices. Second, the government liberalised the hospital sector in
England by giving publicly owned hospitals additional fiscal and managerial autonomy
and encouraging private sector providers to enter the market and deliver care to
publicly funded patients. Third, the government introduced a new case-based hospital
reimbursement system that paid providers a fixed, centrally determined price for every
procedure that they carried out. In sum, policy makers in the NHS hoped that their
efforts to encourage patient choice would create quality competition between hospitals
in England, which would prompt providers to improve their clinical performance
(Department of Health, 2004).
In order to assess the impact of the recent NHS market-based reforms, we exploit the
fact that the choice-based reforms will create sharper financial incentives for hospitals
in markets where choice is geographically feasible. Specifically, we use a difference-
in-difference (DiD) style estimator to test whether patient outcomes in more potentially
competitive markets have improved at a significantly faster rate post-reform than in less
competitive markets after all patients in England were formally given the ability to
select their hospital in 2006. We measure these improvements in quality by examining
changes in 30-day mortality rates for patients diagnosed with an acute myocardial
infarction (AMI). Thirty-day AMI mortality is an appealing quality indicator because
AMIs are easily clinically identifiable, AMI mortality is not subject to gaming or
manipulation like many elective outcomes, and for patients with an AMI, there is a
clear link between appropriate treatment and good outcomes (Bradley et al., 2006; Jha
et al., 2007). Indeed, 30-day AMI mortality is frequently used in the literature assessing
the relationship between competition and overall hospital quality.3
This work adds to the existing literature examining the impact of public sector
reform on service quality. To evaluate the reforms, we use a DiD estimator and (a)
develop a range of concentration measures and illustrate that our results are robust
across each; (b) calculate concentration using elective patient flows and measure quality
using outcomes for an emergency procedure (AMI), which mitigates the selection bias
inherent in using quality measures based on the outcomes of elective procedures; (c)
develop an instrument for market competition that exploits the variability in distance
between a patients GP and their nearest four hospitals (which is largely a historical
artefact) as an exogenous source of variation in the underlying market structure; and
(d) present various tests of robustness that indicate that our estimates arise post-2005
are consistent across various alternative specifications of our estimator and are driven by
hospital market structure and not by spurious associations with urban density.
Ultimately, we find that after the introduction of these reforms in 2006, our marker
for service quality (AMI mortality) improved more quickly for patients living in more
competitive hospital markets. Compared to the mean, AMI mortality has fallen
approximately 0.31 percentage points per year faster in places that were one standard
deviation higher on our market structure index (on a base mortality of 13.82% during
3 See Kessler and McClellan (2000); Propper et al. (2004, 2008); Kessler and Geppert (2005); Gaynor et al.
(2010).
 2011 The Authors.
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the 2002–8 period). As a result we conclude that hospital competition within a market
with fixed prices can improve patient outcomes.
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 examines the existing literature on the
impact of hospital competition on quality. Section 2 outlines the recent NHS market-
based reforms and presents our estimation strategy. Section 3 outlines our data, marker
for service quality and the various measures of competition to define the treated groups
in ourDiDestimations. Section 4presents our results. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
1. Evidence on the Relationship Between Hospital Competition and Hospital
Quality
There is a growing US literature analysing the impact of hospital competition on
hospital quality and efficiency; however, the evidence for England is only just emerging
(Propper et al., 2004, 2008; Cooper et al., 2010a,b; Gaynor et al., 2010). Comprehensive
reviews of this literature can be found in Gaynor (2004), Romano and Mutter (2004),
Propper et al. (2006), Vogt and Town (2006), Cooper et al. (2010b).
A key trend emerging from this literature is that greater competition in markets with
fixed prices generally leads to improvements in hospital performance (Gaynor, 2004,
2006). Examining competition in a fixed price market in the US, Kessler and McClellan
(2000) looked at the impact of hospital competition on AMI mortality for Medicare
beneficiaries from 1985 to 1994. They find that in the 1980s, the impact of competition
was ambiguous but, in the 1990s, higher competition led to lower mortality. Related
work by Kessler and Geppert (2005) also found that competition reduced AMI mor-
tality and that it also led to more intensive treatment for sicker patients and less
intensive treatment for healthier patients. However, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003)
found that increased competition in a fixed price market led to an increase in
mortality, but argue that their results stem from the fact that hospitals in California
were underpaid for treating Medicare patients with AMI. This hypothesis is consistent
with research, which found that lower Medicare reimbursement rates led to increases in
mortality, particularly in competitive markets (Shen, 2003).4
Nearly, all of the English literature on hospital competition examines an earlier set of
NHS reforms – the 1990s internal market. This market allowed hospitals to compete on
quality and price for bulk purchasing contracts but, in general, there is a near uniform
consensus that the internal market never created significant financial incentives for
hospitals to change their behaviour (Le Grand et al.1998; Klein, 1999; Le Grand, 1999).
There is some evidence that prices fell during the internal market (Propper, 1996;
Soderlund et al., 1997; Propper et al., 1998); however, Soderlund et al. (1997) suggest
that higher competition was not associated with lower prices. Propper et al. (2004,
2008) examined the impact of competition on clinical performance during this period.
Both studies find that competition (measured using counts of hospitals within markets
4 Looking at competition in a market with unregulated prices, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) found
that higher competition led to lower AMI mortality, which served as a proxy for overall quality. Likewise, Sari
(2002) uses hospital complication rates as a proxy for quality, and finds that higher hospital competition
led to improvements in quality. Hamilton and Ho (2000) looked at competition in a variable priced market by
examining hospital mergers and found that there was no significant relationship between competition and
mortality. Volpp et al. (2003) examine price competition in New York and find that it is associated with
significant increases in AMI mortality.
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defined by 30 minute isochrones) was associated with lower hospital quality, as
measured by AMI mortality, possibly because hospitals shifted resources towards
reducing waiting times and improving other easily observed measures of performance.
More recently, several working articles, including Bloom et al. (2010), Cooper et al.
(2010a,b), and Gaynor et al. (2010) have investigated the most recent set of post-2006
NHS reforms. In a study on management practice, Bloom et al. (2010) find a
correlation between competition and hospital management quality, and a correlation
between higher management quality and lower AMI mortality. To address concerns
about endogeneity between market structure and management performance in their
cross-sectional analysis, they use a measure of local political vulnerability as an instru-
ment for the number of hospitals, based on the idea that politically vulnerable juris-
dictions tend not to impose unpopular hospital closures. Several studies look more
directly at patient outcomes during the post-2006 period of reform, including an earlier
version of our work on AMI mortality (Cooper et al., 2010b), and a study of the effects
of competition on patients length of stay in hospital (Cooper et al., 2010a). Gaynor
et al. (2010) also look at the effect of competition on AMI mortality and trust-level
overall mortality. These latter articles use DiD related methodologies and find that
higher competition is associated with better hospital performance.
2. Patient Choice and Hospital Competition Reforms and Our Estimation
Strategy
2.1. Competition in the English NHS
The English NHS is a publicly funded health system that is free at the point of use. In the
20 years prior to the reforms, patients had little choice over where they received care.
From 1997 to 2002, the buyers of care (local government organisations) and providers of
care (NHS-owned facilities) were tasked with working cooperatively to organise care for
their local communities (Klein, 2006). In practice, this involved coordinating care
packages and negotiating annual contracts that were based on quality, volume and price.
The recent wave of NHS reforms were introduced in several stages from 2002 to 2008
and focused on increasing patient choice and hospital competition in order to create
financial incentives for providers to improve their quality and efficiency (Department
of Health, 2004, 2009b). The reforms involved changes to the demand side and supply
side, as well as additional reforms to fundamentally restructure how hospitals in Eng-
land were funded. Broadly, the reforms were designed to give patients choice over
where they went for care, together with a reimbursement system where money followed
the users choices, so that hospitals only received funding if they were able to attract
patients. Hospitals were given increased managerial and fiscal autonomy, encouraged
to compete on non-price elements of service and care and paid a fixed price based on a
national tariff for different diagnoses that were drawn up by the Department of Health.
In effect, the reforms created an incentive for hospitals to attract patients and compete
with each other for volume in a market that only allowed providers to differentiate
themselves on quality rather than price.
Figure 1 is a timeline of the key elements of the reforms. The market-based reforms
occurred during a period when there was a significant surge in NHS spending and
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succeeded a wave of heavy performance management that focused on shortening
waiting times. However, these funding changes and the performance management
programme likely had a general effect across England, whereas the impact of the
market-based reforms, which we study, will be much more market dependent.
Prior to 2002, patients themselves could not select where they went for secondary
care and were largely confined to providers within their own Primary Care Trust. From
2002 to 2006, a small subset of patients who were waiting for long periods of time were
allowed to opt to travel further for care but the majority of patients were largely con-
fined to attending their local hospital and providers had no financial incentive to
expand their market share. On 1 January 2006, all patients in England were formally
given the ability to choose where they received elective care (Department of Health,
2009b; Dixon et al., 2010). However, it did take some time for the policy to bed in and
for NHS Choose and Book, the electronic referral system, to become fully active (Dixon
et al., 2010). Therefore, we take mid-2006 after the beginning of the new financial year
as the key point when hospitals in England were significantly exposed to the financial
incentives created by competition.
To create an environment that would support competition, beginning in 2002, the
health service began paying for NHS patients to receive care in private sector facilities
and attempted to diversify the hospital sector (Department of Health, 2002). The NHS
helped to coordinate the development of Independent Sector Treatment Centres
(ISTCs), which were to compete against traditional NHS hospitals to provide elective
surgery and diagnostic services). Furthermore, in an effort to encourage local inno-
vation, the government gave high performing hospitals additional fiscal, clinical and
managerial autonomy. Hospitals that earned additional autonomy were referred to as
Foundation Trusts (FTs) (Department of Health, 2005).
In 2004 and 2005, the government implemented a new fixed-price funding mechan-
ism called Payment By Results (PBR), which was a case-based payment system modelled
on the diagnosis-related group (DRG) system from America (Department of Health,
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Fig. 1. Timeline for the Second Wave of NHS Market-based Reforms (2001–8)
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2009a). Under PBR, hospitals were rewarded for increasing their activity and attracting
more patients. The new reimbursement system allowed money to follow patients choices
so providers were paid for their elective care based on the number of patients they were
able to attract. Ultimately, since GPs are highly active in informing the destination of
most referrals, GPs now play a substantial role dictating how money flows around the
post-2005 NHS.
Along with giving patients a formal choice of where they receive secondary care in
2006, the government also introduced a paperless referral system (Department of
Health, 2009a). The booking interface included the ability to search for hospitals based
on geographic distance and see estimates of each hospitals waiting times that were
based on the last 20 appointments at each facility. The Choose and Book system was
rolled out as patients in the NHS were given a choice of their secondary care provider.
In addition, the government also created a website to provide additional quality
information to inform patients choices. The hope was that providing information to
patients would help them to make informed choices based on quality. The website
currently includes detailed information on various aspects of provider performance,
including risk-adjusted mortality rates, hospital activity levels, waiting times and infec-
tion rates sorted by procedures (Department of Health, 2009c).
2.2. Hypothesis
From mid-2006 onwards, faced with fixed price reimbursements, increased elasticity of
demand and the start of a new financial year, we expect that hospitals located in more
competitive markets to take steps to differentiate themselves from one another on non-
price aspects of their care, and in particular, by improving their clinical performance.
The existing literature from the US suggests that fixed price hospital competition can
prompt hospitals to improve their performance (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Kessler
and Geppert, 2005). We expect a similar response from English providers.
There are reasons to expect that NHS providers should be particularly responsive to
this type of quality competition. First, NHS hospital managers face significant pressure
to maintain annual financial surpluses, which would quickly be eroded if they failed to
attract sufficient market share in the market for elective care and lost ground to other
competing providers. Indeed, the NHS has embedded explicit rewards for high per-
forming providers that maintain surpluses and rewards them with greater financial and
managerial autonomy in the form of granting them FT status. In contrast, poorly
performing hospitals have, in the past, actually had their senior management removed
by the central government. Second, the incentives during the second period may be
particularly sharp because GPs, who serve as patients agents, can now more easily refer
patients to a wider range of hospitals. Elsewhere, Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro
(1983) and Allen (1984), have found that even in markets with imperfect information,
there is likely to be an equilibrium with optimal quality if consumers can perceive
quality ex post and providers have an interest in attracting repeat business. Since GPs
serve as agents for different patients for the same set of conditions on an ongoing basis,
they are well positioned to observe quality ex post and use that information to advise
future patients. In effect, despite the fact that patients seldom attend hospitals for the
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same procedures twice, GPs will be able to take advantage of their knowledge of their
previous patients experiences and outcomes to inform future referrals.
Therefore, we expect that AMI mortality will decrease more quickly in more com-
petitive markets from mid-2006 onwards after hospitals were exposed to competition
created from the new NHS reimbursement system and the expansion of patient choice.
While providers are not explicitly competing for AMI patients because competition in
the NHS is limited to the market for elective care, we expect the market-based reforms to
result in across-the-board improvements in hospital performance, which in turn will
result in lower AMI death rates. To that end, Bloom et al. (2010) looked at NHS hos-
pitals and found that better managed hospitals had significantly lower AMI mortality
and that greater hospital competition was associated with better hospital management.
Indeed, they observed that a one standard deviation improvement in a hospitals overall
management quality was associated with 0.66-percentage point reduction in AMI mor-
tality and that better managed providers were able to attain more revenue per hospital
bed and had higher patient satisfaction. Consistent with their findings, we expect that
competition will prompt providers to improve their overall hospital management, which
will result in across-the-board improvements in clinical performance. We capture these
across-the-board improvements using risk-adjusted 30-day AMI mortality, our measure
of hospital quality (which we discuss in more detail below).
2.3. Specification of Our Empirical Model
Our analysis centres on using regressions based on changes in AMI mortality trends to
test whether hospitals located in more competitive markets improved their perform-
ance post mid-2006, relative to hospitals located in less competitive markets. Whereas,
the bulk of the research on hospital competition relies on analysing a cross-sectional
relationship between measured competition and quality, we use our estimates of
market structure to determine which hospital markets were treated and therefore
exposed to the full force of the NHS market-based reforms after they were introduced.
Our research design is therefore DiD in style. However, the NHS market-based
reforms that we are investigating do not fit neatly within the traditional DiD framework.
In particular, every area in England was exposed, to some degree, to the reforms so, in
principle, there are no distinct treatment and control groups. In practice, however, the
NHS choice reforms will have had varying impact intensity across the country
depending on the underlying geographical relationships between hospitals and res-
idential areas. We assume that hospitals located in areas where choice is not geo-
graphically feasible will be subjected to less sharp financial incentives created from
competition in comparison to hospitals located in areas where patients have consid-
erable potential choice. Our DiD identification strategy is therefore based on the
premise that the incentives from hospital competition are more intense in the period
after the introduction of the NHS choice reforms and increasingly so for hospitals
located in less concentrated markets. Similar DiD estimation strategies have been used
to evaluate the employment effects of minimum wage increases (Card, 1992) and to
study the 1990s internal market NHS reforms (Propper et al., 2008).
The second modification to the standard DiD setup is that, rather than comparing
the levels of quality in the pre and post-policy periods, we estimate the effects of the
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reforms from a break in the time trend in AMI mortality after the mid-2006 policy-on
date. In our preferred empirical specification, we implement this using two-part,
quarterly splines, split at the end of the second quarter in 2006 and interacted with our
measure of potential market structure. We adopt this approach to illustrate explicitly
that there are no differences in trends between high and low competition markets prior
to the reforms. Note, there is no theoretical reason to expect a discrete jump in
hospital quality in the first quarter after the policy-on date in the context of the NHS
reforms and our spline specification imposes this restriction whilst allowing for a more
gradual improvement in quality as the reforms begin to bite. However, as described
below, we test and relax this restriction in our robustness tests.
Our general empirical regression specification is therefore:
deathijkt ¼b1t þ b2I t  ~tjt  ~tf g þ b3zjt t þ b4zjt I t  ~tjt  ~tf g
þ b5zjt þ b6I t  ~tf g þ b7zjt I t  ~tf g þ c0controlsijkt þ error ijkt
ð1Þ
Here, deathijkt is an indicator for whether patient i, from GP market j, treated at hospital
site k died within 30 days of admission for AMI in period t. Subscript t indicates a
running counter of quarters since quarter 1, 2002 (the first period in our data), and ~t is
the break point in the spline, corresponding to our policy-on period starting the end of
the second quarter of 2006. Variable zjt is the market structure index of GP market j at
time t, which we describe in Section 3.3 below.5
We can estimate various alternative specifications by imposing restrictions on
these parameters. Setting b1 = b2 = b3 = b4 = 0 gives rise to a standard DiD specifi-
cation with continuous treatment variable, in which coefficient b7 is the estimated
effect of the policy on the change in death rates between the pre and post-policy
periods. Imposing the restrictions b7 = b6 = 0 instead gives our preferred spline-
based difference-in-trends estimator in which b4 is the effect of the policy on the
annual rate of change in death rates. Relaxing all these restrictions gives a combi-
nation of these two estimators, allowing for a step change at the policy-on date and
a change in trends.
Our preferred specification is the one that imposes b7 = b6 = 0, but we report on the
others in our robustness checks. In this preferred specification, coefficient b1 captures
the baseline rate of decline in AMI mortality prior to the 2006 reforms, for locations in
which our index of market structure is zero (a monopoly). Coefficients b1 + b2 capture
the baseline rate of mortality decline in these low-competition places after reform.
Now consider a comparator place where there is high competition. The sum of
b1 + b3 equals the time trend in mortality in these areas before the reform. The sum
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 is the time trend in mortality in highly competitive areas after the
2006 reform. The second partial derivate of the death rate trend with respect to dif-
ferences in competition in the post-policy period is b4. This is our coefficient of interest
and is a DiD estimate of the effect of competition on the trends in mortality.6
5 This index is calculated from data for the whole calendar year, rather than the quarter.
6 This is easily deduced since:
Treatment effect ¼ ½ðb1 þ b2 þ b3Dnlhhi þ b4DnlhhiÞ  ðb1 þ b3DnlhhiÞ  ½ðb1 þ b2Þ  b1
¼ b4Dnlhhi:
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The coefficient b3 is also informative, in that it provides the basis to test for the exis-
tence of pre-policy differences in trends between high and low competition places
b3 6¼ 0. The existence of pre-policy differences in trends would undermine the credi-
bility of the DiD strategy.
We estimate (1) using Ordinary Least Squares and cluster our standard errors at the
GP level to allow for error correlation across patients within GP markets. Note that the
specification in equation (1) includes a vector of control variables as discussed in the
data section and can be generalised to include hospital and GP fixed effects. Our
specifications further include an interaction between Strategic Health Authorities
(SHAs) and time trends, controlling for trends associated with local SHA policies and
changes in regional funding.7
3. Data, Our Measures of Competition, Our Quality Indicator and the
Instrumental Variable Strategy
3.1. Data Sources and Setup
Our article relies on patient-level Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) data from 2002 to
2008. In addition to observations for patients with an emergency AMI, our analysis
contains data on patients undergoing elective hip replacement, knee replacement,
knee arthroscopy, cataract repair and hernia repair, which we use in the construction of
our competition indices. At the hospital level, we know hospital site postcodes, the NHS
trust to which the site belongs, and we have indicators of the hospital type (teaching
hospitals, FTs status) and hospital size. Our work improves on previous research by
using the hospital site-specific locations, rather than the trust headquarters. There are
typically multiple treatment sites for each trust, separated by distances of up to 50 km,
so using Trust locations provides only a very approximate indicator of the location at
which treatment is carried out.8
We use GP and hospital site postcodes to calculate distances between patients GPs
and the hospital where care was delivered. This distance is a key component in our
analysis and is used as an input into most of our competition measures. For our main
analysis, we use matrices of straight-line distances between GPs and NHS sites. For some
of our supplementary results, we calculate origin-destination matrices from minimum
road travel times along the primary road network.9
7 There are ten NHS Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in England; each represents a different region of
the country. SHAs are responsible for implementing the policy that is set by the Department of Health and
managing local health care provision. Increasingly, over the period we study, policy making has been devolved
to local SHAs.
8 In addition, our data includes information on NHS funded patients who received elective surgery from
privately owned providers. However, as it has been well documented, HES data has poor coverage of care
delivered in private settings. This does not present a problem for our analysis, since during our period of
analysis, private providers accounted for less than 3% of total NHS volume. Approximately 5% of our sample
received elective surgery in privately owned facilities. In addition, consistent with other research (Gaynor
et al., 2010; Propper and van Reenen, 2010), and NHS data cleaning rules, we limit our analysis to providers
who treat over 99 AMIs per year.
9 This generalised network was provided by the Department of Transport and is populated with road link-
specific travel speeds derived from their National Transport Model for 2003. We generated the GP hospital
origin-destination matrix using the Network Analysis tools from the ESRI ArcGIS software package.
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3.2. Measures of Health Care Quality
Our measure of hospital quality is the 30-day mortality rate for patients with an AMI.10
In our analysis, we include every patient who had a main International Classification of
Disease 10 code of I21 or I22 and only include emergency AMI admissions and
admissions where the patients length of stay was three days or more (unless the patient
died within the first three days of being admitted) (World Health Organization,
2009).11
We chose to use AMI mortality as our measure of performance for four primary
reasons. First, AMIs are a relatively frequent, easily observable medical occurrences that
are clinically identifiable and have a substantial mortality rate. For example, in 2008 the
overall, 30-day mortality rate for emergency AMI was 11.7% compared to a mortality
rate of 0.20% for elective hip replacement. Second, with AMIs, there is a clear link
between timely and high-quality medical intervention and patients survival (Bradley
et al., 2006; Jha et al., 2007). Contrast this with a quality indicator such as readmissions
for elective hip replacements, where a patient failing to stick to a rehabilitation pro-
gramme after they were discharged could produce poor outcomes or lead to a read-
mission. Third, unlike other measures of performance, like hospital waiting times, AMI
mortality (and death rates in general) are not subject to gaming or manipulation by
hospitals. Fourth, AMIs are an emergency procedure where patients are generally taken
directly to their nearest provider for care with little discretion over which hospital they
attend, which mitigates hospitals ability to risk-select healthier patients for care. The
fact that AMI is a non-elective procedure also mitigates biases due to the endogeneity of
market structure to elective quality. This point is illustrated in Appendix A.
A further impetus for using AMI mortality is that it is frequently used by governments
and private organisations to rank and compare hospital performance (including by the
UK government).12,13 Consequently, 30-day AMI mortality is also often used in the
academic literature as a measure of overall hospital performance in the UK and the US
(Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Volpp et al., 2003; Propper et al., 2004, 2008; Kessler and
Geppert, 2005; Bloom et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2010; Propper and van Reenen, 2010).
Consistent with its use as a measure of hospital performance, a recent study assessing
the relationship between hospitals management quality and their overall performance
found a statistically significant relationship between overall hospital management
10 Our mortality measure only includes deaths that occurred within the hospital. While there are 30-day all
cause AMI mortality figures, they rely on linking HES data to data on deaths provided by the Office for
National Statistics (ONS). Unfortunately, those data linkages were not reliable for the years in our analysis
and we find that when using them, the number of deaths in the hospital are equal to the number of total
deaths out of the hospital Given that during the period we investigate, length of stay for patients with an AMI
only reduced by less than 2% (from 9.43 to 9.26 days), its unlikely our results were driven by hospitals
discharging patients sicker and quicker.
11 We choose to limit our analysis to patients with a length of stay of over two days or patients who died in
the first two days of their admission in order to avoid possible up-coding, whereby patients with other
conditions were coded as having an AMI in order to generate larger reimbursements. Up-coding may have
been prevalent during this period as the government shifted to a fixed-price, prospective reimbursement
system (Street and Maynard, 2007).
12 As Davies et al. (2001) note, 30-day AMI quality is used for hospital rankings by healthgrades.com, the
Michigan Hospital Association (where its aggregated with congestive heart failure and angina), the UK
Department of Health, the California Hospital Outcomes Project, the Greater New York Hospital Association,
and the University Hospital Consortium.
13 See http://2008ratings.cqc.org.uk/findcareservices/informationabouthealthcareservices.cfm
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performance and hospital level 30-day AMI mortality (Bloom et al., 2010). Likewise,
according to data made publicly available by Dr. Foster Health, despite accounting for
less than 3% of total hospital deaths, standardised AMI mortality in English hospitals
was positively correlated (r = 0.33) with overall hospital mortality for the financial year
beginning in 2009.14 Likewise, in our administrative data, we have found that raw AMI
mortality is positively correlated with elective hip and knee replacement waiting times
(r = 0.33) and positively correlated with length of stay for elective hip and knee
replacement (r = 0.11 and r = 0.22, respectively).
While 30-day AMI mortality is a frequently used measure of hospital quality, there are
several issues with its use. First, as with all quality measures, despite being correlated
with other dimensions of performance, there is a question of whether or not a single
measure can capture the multi-dimensional nature of health care quality (McClellan
and Staiger, 1999). A second issue with 30-day mortality is the noise inherent with this
type of measure. This noise is particularly acute when researchers use hospital level
data, where it is difficult to suitably risk adjust and hospital performance can vary from
year to year. Our use of patient-level data, which allows for controls for patients
socioeconomic status, age and co-morbidities, mitigates this problem. In our estima-
tion, we control for co-morbidities using the Charlson co-morbidity index (Charlson
et al., 1978) and control for patients socio-economic status using the income vector of
the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation, which we include at the Census Output Area
level (Communities and Local Government Department, 2009).15,16
3.3. Market Measures and Estimates of Market Structure
Identifying the impact of competition in the wake of NHS reforms requires accurately
measuring market structure. In this article, we estimate market structure in the English
NHS using both counts of providers and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) cal-
culated using actual and predicted patient flows. Our aim in developing a range of
measures of market structure is to illustrate that our results are robust across a number
of measures of market structure, since there is not a single, agreed upon measure that
is immune to each and every form bias.
The debate over measuring market structure centres around thwarting potential
endogeneity between hospital quality and market structure, avoiding measures of
market structure that simply reflect urban population density and defining a market
size that accurately reflects the choice sets available to NHS users. Concerns over the
endogeneity between measures of market structure and firm performance have been
14 Dr Foster is a commercial company that measures provider performance in the the NHS; see http://
www.drfosterhealth.co.uk, last accessed March 1, 2011.
15 For confidentiality reasons, the patient home addresses are not available for use in our analysis.
However, we do have access to codes that identify the patients GP and GP postcode. There are around 7600–
7700 GP postcodes in each year in our data. Patients can usually (at the time relevant for our study) only
register at a GP practice if they live in the catchment area of that GP, so GPs serve as a strong proxy for
patients home addresses.
16 The Charlson index of co-morbidities is a zero to six ranking of illness severity, which predicts the
probability of a patients’ one-year mortality based on the presence of certain co-morbidities. It is calculated
based on the presence of illnesses described in the secondary diagnosis field within the HES dataset.
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frequently cited in the literature and stem from three aspects of the construction of the
market structure measures.
These different forms of bias could positively or negatively affect our estimates. First,
the physical market size itself could be associated with hospital performance, which
would bias our estimates upwards. For example, a high-quality provider might attract
patients from a larger area, and hence appear to be operating in a less concentrated
market. Second, the actual patient flows that are used to estimate market shares (and
form the key component of the HHI) could be associated with quality because high
quality providers could attract all the local business and as a result appear to be
operating in more concentrated markets and bias our estimates downwards. Third, the
actual location of hospitals and of new market entrants may be associated with per-
formance. For example, if new hospitals were reluctant to locate near high quality
providers, this would artificially show high quality providers to be operating within
concentrated markets and bias our estimates of the treatment effect downwards.
In addition to concerns about endogeneity, there are also fears that the various
measures of market structure will be spuriously correlated with urban population
density, which stem from two causes. First, densely populated cities have more hospitals
within smaller geographic areas, and as a result, urban areas will likely appear more
competitive. Second, measures of market structure that are calculated within fixed
geographic markets may be biased because the time it takes to travel 30 km in an urban
area will differ significantly from the time it takes to travel 30 km in a rural area.
In our estimates of market structure, we calculate competition within the market for
elective secondary care for NHS funded patients. We focused on competition for elective
care because this was the only hospital market where competition occurred during the
time period we are studying. We study five high volume procedures – hip replacement,
knee replacement, arthroscopy, hernia repair and cataract repair – and develop com-
posite measures of market structure, which are weighted averages of the competition
measures that we calculated for each of the individual procedures. The bulk of our
measures of market structure are based on actual patient flows. However, Kessler and
McClellan (2000) have suggested that any measures of market structure based on actual
patient flows could be endogenous to hospital quality because they may be correlated
with various unobserved characteristics of either patients or providers. As a result, in
addition to using an instrumental variable strategy, we also estimate a measure of market
structure, similar to themeasure used in Kessler andMcClellan (2000), which is based on
predicted patient flows generated from models of patient choice.
We centre all of our markets on GP practices, rather than on hospitals, because this
mirrors the post-2005 NHS market structure, where patients select their hospital in
conjunction with their GP (Dixon et al., 2010). In addition, were we to centre our
measures of market structure on hospitals, then there is the risk that if unobserved
determinants of hospital choice are correlated with patient characteristics, there could
be spurious and problematic associations between health status and market structure.
To measure market concentration using actual patient flows, we calculate the neg-
ative natural logarithm of an HHI (nlhhi) based on hospitals market shares. This
transformation is convenient because the nlhhi increases with competition, with zero
corresponding to monopoly and infinity to perfect competition. In addition, this
measure is equivalent to the natural log of the number of equal size firms in the
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market, which makes interpreting the index more intuitive. Thus, for given market area
j, our concentration index is:
nlhhij ¼  ln
XK
k¼1
nk^
Nj
 2
¼ ln 1
hhij
 
¼ lnðequivalent number of equal sized providersÞ ð2Þ
Here, nk is the number of procedures carried out at hospital k within market j and Nj
is the total number of procedures carried out in market j. Note that nk includes pro-
cedures performed at hospital k that were not referred from market j.
We construct our preferred market definition as follows: consider an elective proce-
dure, e.g. hip replacements, in one year, e.g. 2002. We use matrices of patient flows from
GP practices to hospitals for hip replacement in 2002 to deduce GP-centred markets.
Specifically, we find the radius that represents the 95th percentile of distance travelled
from a GP practice to hospitals for hip replacements in 2002. This defines the feasible
choice set for patients at this GP practice in 2002. We then compute the HHI based on all
hospitals providing hip replacements within this GPs market, regardless of whether
this GP actually refers patients to all of these hospitals. This process is repeated for all GPs,
for all years 2002–8 and for all five key elective procedures. A single elective HHI is
calculated for eachGPper year as a weighted average of the procedure-specificHHIs with
weights proportional to the volume of patients in each procedure category.17
In addition to calculating this HHI within a variable radius market, we also compute
a number of alternative HHIs using other market definitions. These include an HHI
measured within a fixed radius market, which is derived in a similar way to the variable
radius HHI described above, except that we use a fixed 30 km radius drawn around
each GP practice in the country to delineate the market boundaries. The second
alternative index is an HHI based on travel times along the primary road network from
each GP. Here, we include hospitals in our relevant markets if they fall within a 30-min
car ride from a referring GP. A third alternative is based on our 95% variable radius
market but it does not treat sites within the same trust as competitors and only views
sites from a different Trust as viable alternatives in the calculation of our HHI. We have
also calculated our preferred purchaser-perspective measures using the count of hos-
pitals within each market in lieu of using HHIs. In addition, we calculate one measure
of market concentration from the providers perspective, where the market is centred
on hospitals and the market is defined a fixed radius of 20 km drawn around each site.
Alongside the HHIs we generated using actual patient flows, we also created an
HHI derived from predicted patient flows that is based on the strategy used in Kessler
and McClellan (2000). Building our predicted patient flow HHI is a two-step pro-
cedure. The first step involves estimating a patient choice model based on hospital
and GP locations, and hospital and patient characteristics.18 From this step we predict
the number of patients each GP refers to their local hospitals, controlling for patient
17 It is important to note that GPs do not need to refer patients to a particular hospital within their market
for the hospital to be included in the nlhhi associated with the GP.
18 Patient characteristics included age, gender, socio-economic status and severity of illness. Provider
characteristics included indicator dummies for teaching status, public or private ownership and FT status.
Distance was measured as the straight-line distance from GPs to hospital sites.
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and provider characteristics and GP-hospital differential distances. We then use these
numbers to generate the HHIs.19 However, whereas Kessler and McClellan (2000)
used a conditional logit to model patient choices, we use a Poisson regression on
aggregate GP-hospital flows, which is equivalent but is simpler to compute (Gui-
maraes et al., 2003).
As Table 1 illustrates, all these measures of GP-centred competition are moderately
correlated. The indices from fixed radius and time-based market definitions are highly
correlated. Indices based on market definitions using GP hospital flows are quite highly
correlated with each other and only moderately correlated with the fixed distance and
time-based indices. We favour the variable radius methods that infer markets from
de-facto patient choices over hospitals, not least because this is less correlated with
urban density.20
As a further check of robustness, we estimate (1) substituting an indicator variable
for our competition measure, which is equal to one if a patients GP practice is located
in an urban area.21 For further robustness, we also reconstruct the competition index
19 Following Kessler and McClellan (2000), we used these predicted counts (countjk), which is the expected
number of patients each GP j refers to hospital k in a given year to generate market shares, denoted ajk, for all
hospitals k = 1,…,K, located within 100 km of j:
bajk ¼ dcountjkPK
k¼1 dcountjk :
We then used these predicted market shares generated from the predicted count of patients referred from j
to k to create GP-level HHIs. These GP-level HHIs were the sum of the squares of the predicted market shares
of providers within 100 km of j:
HHI j ¼
XK
k¼1
a^2jk :
This measure would be similar to our fixed radius HHIs centred on GP practices, except that the market
shares used to create the HHIj would be based on predicted patient flows. Consistent with Kessler and
McClellan (2000), we weight these GP HHIs by bjk, which is the share of patients from GP j which comprise
the total activity of hospital k, in order to generate hospital level HHIs that are vary based on the competi-
tiveness of the various GP markets served by hospital k, such that
b^jk ¼
dcountjkPJ
j¼1 dcountjk ;
and,
HHI k ¼
XJ
j¼1
b^jk
XK
k¼1
a^2jk
 !
¼
XJ
j¼1
b^jkHHI j :
However, as Kessler and McClellan (2000) noted, since there is potential that unobserved determinants of
patients hospital choice could be correlated with patients underlying health status, we assign HHIk back to
GP practices based on the shares of patients from GP j treated at all hospitals k = 1,…, k located within a
100 km radius of j:
HHI j ¼
XK
k¼1
a^jk
XJ
j¼1
b^jk
XK
k¼1
a^2jk
 !" #
¼
XK
k¼1
a^jkHHI j
This HHIj* is calculated for all years and for all five procedures and then averaged across the five procedures
weighted by the total volume of each procedure performed per year. Thus, this measure varies both by year
and by GP.
20 This is easily seen when our various concentration measures are superimposed onto a map of England.
These mappings are available from the authors on request.
21 A GP is located in an urban area if the local output area falls within urban settlements with a population
of 10,000 or more, according to the UK Office of National Statistics - available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
geography/census_geog.asp.
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using the shares of secondary school pupils in schools within our GP-centred markets
(defined by the 95% referral radius during the pre-policy period) for use in a placebo
test. These tests are designed to confirm that our results are driven by competition,
rather than spurious associations with urban density.
3.4. Instrumental Variable Estimation
In an effort to thwart the endogeneity that we described earlier, in addition to creating
HHIs from predicted patient flows, we have also developed an instrument for com-
petition. Our preferred instrument takes advantage of the historically determined
hospital locations in England and is based on the variation in distance to a patients
nearest four hospitals. Specifically, our instrument for market structure is the standard
deviation of distances from GPs to their nearest four hospitals, conditional the on the
distance to the patient’s nearest hospital (a control which we introduce in order to
control for potential urban ⁄ rural differences in GP location). This IV strategy rests on
the fact that NHS hospital and GP relative positions are unrelated to hospital quality,
which is supported by the fact that hospital locations in England are largely a historical
artefact which have not changed substantially since the NHS was founded in 1948
(Klein, 2006).
To illustrate our IV strategy, imagine two hospital markets centred on two indi-
vidual GP practices (A and B). The nearest provider in the area of GPA is located at
5 km, and the remaining three at 15, 20 and 30 km. The nearest provider to GPB is
also at 5 km, but with the remaining three all within 10 km (in different directions).
In this situation, while the distance to the nearest provider is the same in both
cases, the alternatives available to patients of GPB are much more substitutable than
the alternatives available to patients of GPA because they are all within a similar
travel distance, so patients of GPA are much more likely to attend the nearest
provider. We therefore assume that GP-centred markets characterised by a high
dispersion in distances to local providers are low choice and therefore low com-
petition markets.
In practice, we have three instrumented variables, which include the baseline meas-
ure of market structure, the pre-policy time trend interacted with market structure and
the post-policy time trend interacted with market structure. We perform our IV with a
2SLS estimator and include GP and hospital fixed effects.
Table 1
Correlations Between Different Measures of Market Structure
log(HHI)
95%
log(HHI)
30 km
log(HHI)
30 min
log(HHI)-
predicted
flows Mean
Standard
deviation
log(HHI)-95% 1.00 0.7483 0.5639
log(HHI)-30 km 0.48 1.00 1.4860 0.9053
log(HHI)-30 min 0.43 0.92 1.00 1.2686 0.8081
log(HHI)-predicted flows 0.47 0.92 0.86 1.00 1.0458 0.5930
Notes. HHI, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes.
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4. Results
4.1. Empirical Results
Our estimation sample contains 433,325 patients who had an AMI between 2002 and
2008. There are 227 hospital sites providing care for AMI for patients who were
registered at 7,742 GP practices. Hospital quality, measured by 30-day AMI in-hospital
mortality, improved consistently from 2002 to 2008, as shown in Table 2. Likewise,
the number of AMIs treated per year also fell. This reduction in mortality and
reduction in overall AMI occurrences is consistent with international trends and is
driven, in part, by increasing adoption of new technology in the treatment of AMI
and improvements in public health (Committee on Second Hand Smoke Exposure
and Acute Coronary Events, 2009; Meyers et al., 2009; Schroeder, 2009; Walker et al.,
2009). The coefficient of variation in 30-day mortality rates between hospitals was
approximately 30% per year, suggesting that there is significant variation in outcomes
between providers.
Table 3 provides OLS estimates of the DiD specification of (1) using our pre-
ferred empirical specification and index of market structure (the nlhhi using the
95% GP market described in Section 3.3 and restricting b6 = b7 = 0 as discussed in
Section 2.3). The variables of interest in our sample are described in Appendix B.
Our main interest is in the coefficient on the interaction between the 2006–8 trend
and our market structure index. This coefficient is b4 in (1) and it estimates the
impact of our policy by measuring the effect of greater competition on the quar-
terly reduction in AMI mortality after patient choice and competition were intro-
duced in 2006.
Table 3 reports several versions of our preferred specification, where we have
included and excluded patient characteristics, hospital and GP fixed effects. The
results presented in Table 3 illustrate that our main finding is not highly sensitive to
the control variables we include in our estimator. In each specification in Table 3, we
find that after the formal introduction of choice in 2006, mortality decreased more
quickly in more competitive markets. The coefficient of our interaction term is nearly
Table 2
Thirty-day Patient-level AMI Mortality from 2002 to 2008
Year Population treated Mean mortality Standard deviation
2002 64933 0.1563 0.3631
2003 64776 0.1506 0.3576
2004 66226 0.1415 0.3485
2005 62433 0.1396 0.3465
2006 59760 0.1309 0.3373
2007 59017 0.1247 0.3304
2008 56180 0.1196 0.3245
2002–8 433,325 0.1381 0.3451
Notes. Observations are limited to patients between 39 and 100 years of age with a length of stay greater than
two days, treated at sites that treated more than 99 AMIs per year. Unlike the regressions that we present, we
do not limit the distance that patients travelled for care. AMI, acute myocardial infarction.
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identical in all specifications and it remains negative and significant with and without
GP and hospital fixed effects or the exclusion of patient characteristics. Column (5) is
our overall preferred specification and includes both GP and hospital fixed effects,
which control for the possibility of changing GP, patient and hospital composition in
high competition and low competition areas. Based on the coefficient of interest in
Column (5) from Table 3, taking a one standard deviation gap in nlhhi (=0.565) as our
benchmark, 30-day AMI mortality fell 0.31 percentage points faster per year after the
reforms for patients treated in more competitive markets (=0.564  0.0014  4,
because the time trends are quarters). Framed differently, the shift from a market with
two equally sized providers to one with four equally sized providers after the reforms
would have resulted in a 0.39 percentage point faster reduction in AMI mortality per
year from 2006 onwards.
An essential observation from Table 3 is that the pre-policy trend in AMI mortality in
areas with uncompetitive market structures is not statistically different from the trend
in markets with competitive structures once we control for patient characteristics. The
coefficient on the 2002–5 Trend  nlhhi interaction is near zero and statistically insig-
nificant in all specifications other than Column (1), which includes no control vari-
ables. This shows that these different markets were balanced in terms of the mortality
trends pre-reform, and allays fears that the DiD results simply pick up pre-existing
differences in trends. The full set of results from our overall preferred specification are
presented in Appendix C.
Table 3
Least Squared Estimates of (1) with Market Structure Measured as the nlhhi Within a
Market That Captures all Hospitals Within the 95th Percentile of each GP’s Maximum
Travel Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2002–5 Trend 0.0018***
(0.0002)
0.0026
(0.0002)
0.0024***
(0.0002)
0.0023***
(0.0002)
0.0024***
(0.0002)
2006–8 Trend 0.0004**
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0004)
2002–5 Trend  nlhhi 0.0004*
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
2006–8 Trend  nlhhi 0.0013**
(0.0004)
0.0013**
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0005)
0.0013**
(0.0004)
0.0014***
(0.0005)
nlhhi 0.0017
(0.0023)
0.0020
(0.0022)
0.0015
(0.0028)
0.0014
(0.0027)
0.0015
(0.0028)
Patient characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects No No Yes No Yes
GP fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
N 422,350 422,350 422,350 422,350 422,350
R2 0.036 0.105 0.126 0.125 0.126
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient
died within 30 days of their admission to hospital following an emergency AMI. Hospital characteristics:
hospital type (foundation trust, teaching hospital or traditional acute hospital), number of AMIs treated at
the hospital per year. Patient characteristics: age, gender, Charlson comorbidity score and patient socio-
economic status measured using the income component of the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivations at the
output area. Standard errors are clustered on GP-practices. AMI, acute myocardial infarction.
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Table 4 shows that the results we observed in Table 3 are not highly sensitive to
the choice of which market structure index we use to define the treated groups.22 It
presents OLS estimates of (1) using seven separate measures of market structure. Our
findings remain consistent and significant across the seven different measures of
market structure. The coefficient on the interaction between market structure and the
2006–8 trend is always negative and significant, illustrating that higher competition was
associated with higher quality (lower mortality), regardless of how we quantified market
structure. Column 3 includes estimates of competition where we fix the nlhhi in time as
the average of the 2002–5 nlhhis, which uses pre-reform patient flows from a time
period where patients had no choice over their provider (hence the patient flows are
likely unrelated to quality). In addition, in Column (6) we have also presented a
Table 4
Least Squared Estimates of (1) Using Seven Alternative Measures of Market Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2002–5 Trend 0.0024***
(0.0002)
0.0024***
(0.0002)
0.0022***
(0.0002)
0.0026***
(0.0002)
0.0026***
(0.0002)
0.0023***
(0.0002)
0.0028***
(0.0002)
2006–8 Trend 0.0018***
(0.0004)
0.0016***
(0.0004)
0.0020***
(0.0004)
0.0012**
(0.0005)
0.0015**
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0014**
(0.0005)
2002–5 Trend  nlhhi 0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0003)
0.0003*
(0.0001)
0.0003*
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0006**
(0.0002)
2006–8 Trend  nlhhi 0.0012*
(0.0005)
0.0015**
(0.0005)
0.0017*
(0.0007)
0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0012**
(0.0004)
nlhhi – 0.0026
(0.0032)
0.0022
(0.0042)
0.0036
(0.0070)
0.0013
(0.0067)
0.0099
(0.0061)
0.0091
(0.0073)
Patient characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 422,350 422,350 382,026 439,365 437,185 421,094 461,508
R2 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.124
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Column (1) nlhhi = negative ln of
HHIwithin 95% variablemarket with competitionmeasured as the averageHHIbetween2002 and2005 prior to
the reforms; column (2) nlhhi = negative ln of HHI within 95% variable market where competition is measured
between hospital trusts, not sites; column (3) nlhhi = negative ln of HHI within 75% variable radius market;
column (4) nlhhi = negative ln of HHI within fixed 30 km radiusmarket; column (5) nlhhi = negative ln of HHI
withinmarket defined by 30-min drive time from eachGP practice; column (6) nlhhi is centred on hospitals and
defined within a 20 km fixed radius; column (7) nlhhi = negative log of HHI based on predicted patient flows.
Dependent variable = 1 if patientdiedwithin30-days of their admission tohospital followinganemergencyAMI.
Hospital characteristics: hospital type (foundation trust, teaching hospital or traditional acute hospital),
numberofAMIs treated at thehospital per year. Patient characteristics: age, gender,Charlson comorbidity score
and patient socioeconomic status measured using the income component of the 2004 Index of Multiple
Deprivations at the output area.
Standard errors are clustered on GP-practices. HHI, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes; AMI, acute myocardial
infarction.
22 Note that we limit observations in our analysis to patients who travelled for care within their relevant
geographic market. For example, if we measured competition within fixed 30 km markets, we limited our
observations who travelled less than 30 km for care. We introduced this limit so that if a patient had a heart
attack away from home, it would not indicate that their local market structure was associated with the location
where they received care. This is why the number of observations in our analysis varies according to the
measure of market structure used in the particular estimation.
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measure of market structure centred on hospitals. Finally, Column (7) includes
estimates of our treatment effect where market concentration is measured using pre-
dicted patient flows similar to those used by Kessler and McClellan (2000).
In addition to using HHIs, in Table 5 we also present least squares estimates of (1)
using logged hospital counts within each market definition to calculate market struc-
ture across the country. While counts are not as sensitive to the underlying market
characteristics as an HHI, they do not rely on patient flows and serve as a robustness
check on our HHI estimations. We calculate count measures of competition in four
market definitions – two separate variable radius markets, a fixed radius market and a
time-based radius market. The counts are logged so our estimates are more easily
comparable to the nlhhis. Regardless of the count-based market structure measure that
we use, we consistently find that the interaction term of interest is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that a competitive market structure was associated with a statistically
significant reduction in AMI mortality after 2006 with estimates that are a similar
magnitude to those we generated measuring market structure using HHIs.
To illustrate that our findings are the result of changes in hospital quality, rather
than the by-product of different patient populations living in high versus low compe-
tition regions, we estimated (1) using hospital  year fixed effects. Hospital interactions
on year fixed effects should capture improvements in quality from hospitals year to
year. When we estimated (1) and included hospital  year fixed effects interactions, as
anticipated, it washes out the effect of competition.
Table 5
Least Squared Estimates of (1) with Market Concentration Measured as the Natural Log
of the Count of Hospitals Within Four Market Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002–5 Trend 0.0025***
(0.0002)
0.0023***
(0.0002)
0.0026***
(0.0002)
0.0027***
(0.0002)
2006–8 Trend 0.0013**
(0.0005)
0.0015***
(0.0004)
0.0012*
(0.0005)
0.0013*
(0.0005)
2002–5 Trend  count 0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.0003*
(0.0001)
2006–8 Trend  count 0.0009**
(0.0003)
0.0016***
(0.0004)
0.0008**
(0.0003)
0.0008**
(0.0003)
count 0.0031
(0.0019)
0.0006
(0.0027)
0.0049
(0.0058)
0.0032
(0.0058)
Patient characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 422,350 382,026 439,365 433,699
R2 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.126
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Column (1) 95% variable market;
column (2) 75% Variable market; column (3) Fixed 30 km radius market; column (4) market defined 30-min
travel time from each GP. Dependent variable = 1 if patient died within 30-days of their admission to hospital
after an emergency AMI. Hospital characteristics: Hospital type (foundation trust, teaching hospital or tra-
ditional acute hospital), number of AMIs treated at the hospital per year and patient characteristics: age,
gender, Charlson comorbidity score and patient socioeconomic status measured using the income compo-
nent of the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivations at the output area. Standard errors are clustered on GP-
practices. AMI, acute myocardial infarction.
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4.2. Test of Functional Form
Table 6 presents additional estimates of our treatment effect using different function
functional forms discussed in Section 2.3, and shows some tests on the various
parameter restrictions in the general model of (1). In addition to our preferred esti-
mator, we estimate the treatment effect using a traditional DiD regression (Column 1),
added the post-policy dummy and a post-policy * market structure interaction to our
Table 6
Alternative Regression Specification with Market Structure Measured as the nlhhi Within a
Market that Captures all Hospitals Within the 95th Percentile of each GP’s Maximum
Travel Distance
Standard difference-in-
difference
Time trend interactions &
post * nlhhi interaction
Year-post
dummies * nlhhi
Post 0.0267***
(0.0020)
2002–5 Trend 0.0023***
(0.0002)
2003_Post 0.0072*
(0.0032)
Post  nlhhi 0.0038*
(0.0019)
2006–8 Trend 0.0013**
(0.0005)
2004_Post 0.0123***
(0.0031)
Nlhhi 0.0030
(0.0022)
2002–5 Trend  nlhhi 0.0000
(0.0002)
2005_Post 0.0097**
(0.0032)
2006–8 Trend  nlhhi 0.0015**
(0.0004)
2006_Post 0.0091**
(00033)
nlhhi 0.0004
(0.0035)
2007_Post 0.0027
(0.0035)
Post 0.0024
(0.0029)
2008_Post 0.0082*
(0.0036)
Post  nlhhi 0.0029
(0.0031)
2003_Post 
nlhhi
0.0023
(0.0036)
2004_Post 
nlhhi
0.0027
(0.0034)
2005_Post 
nlhhi
0.0025
(0.0035)
2006_Post 
nlhhi
0.0015
(0.0038)
2007_Post 
nlhhi
0.0077*
(0.0038)
2007_Post 
nlhhi
0.0018
(0.0037)
nlhhi 0.0001
(0.0031)
F-test p-value All time trends 0.0000
Trends * nlhhi 0.0018
Post & post * nlhhi 0.4470
Patient characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 422,350 422,350 422,350
R2 0.125 0.126 0.126
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient
died within 30-days of their admission to hospital following an emergency AMI. Hospital characteristics:
Hospital type (foundation trust, teaching hospital or traditional acute hospital), number of AMIs treated at
the hospital per year. Patient characteristics: age, gender, Charlson comorbidity score, patient socioeconomic
status measured using the income component of the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivations at the output area.
Standard errors are clustered on GP-practices. AMI, acute myocardial infarction.
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preferred spline estimator (Column 2), and shown the most general specification with
year dummies and year dummies interacted with market structure (Column 3). Note
the specification in Column 3 is set up so that the coefficients show the marginal
change from the previous year.
As Table 6 illustrates, our estimates of the treatment effect of competition are not
substantively dependent on the functional form of our estimator. The simple DiD
estimator in column 1 shows a fall in mortality in high competition areas relative to low
competition areas after the policy-on date. The estimates presented in the second
column of Table 6 suggest that there was not a discrete jump in performance in 2006
and provides support for our preferred spline specification that is predicated on the
presence of a more gradual improvement in performance. We provide some formal
tests for these restrictions in Column 2. The joint test of significance of all the spline
coefficients gives a p-value less than 0.01, the test for the two coefficients on the
interaction between the splines and market structure index is 0.001. In contrast, the
joint test of the coefficients on the post-policy dummy and post-policy  market structure
interaction gives a p-value of 0.447. These tests provide evidence in favour of our spline-
based, difference-in trends specification.
In the third column, with the most flexible non-parametric specification, the coef-
ficients of interest on the year  market structure interactions are negative in 2006, 2007
and 2008. Although these last semi-parametric estimates are imprecise, the drop in the
2007 period is significant at 5% and the general pattern of point estimates is broadly in
line with our main results.
Figure 2 plots the predicted mortality rates over time using the point estimates from
this semi-parametric procedure, by way of illustrating the general pattern, which our
estimates are trying to uncover. The dashed line shows the prediction for concentrated
market structure locations (i.e. with the market structure index set to zero,
corresponding to one hospital), which represent the counterfactual of what would have
happened to AMI mortality in the absence of the reforms. The solid line shows the
–0.03
–0.02
–0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 Site
90th Percentile
Fig. 2. Changes in Predicted Mortality Rates Over Time in Monopoly Markets with One-Site Providing
Care and in Markets in the Most Competitive Decile of Our Market Structure Index
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pattern for competitive market structures, with the index set to the top decile
(nlhhi = 1.55). Both plots are normalised to zero in 2006. The plots show clearly that
the trends tracked together prior to the reform date, but diverged from 2005 ⁄6 on. The
picture supports our main finding that locations with less concentrated markets that
were most exposed to the effects of the reforms sustained a higher and improved rate
of decline in mortality rates than the counterfactual areas that remained less exposed
to competition.
4.3. Other Tests of Robustness and Instrumental Variables Estimates
Table 7 presents robustness checks to illustrate that the effect we identify in our
interactions between our post-2006 time trend and our measure of market structure are
not simply spurious associations with urban density or driven by problematic (endo-
genous) associations between market structure and firm performance. In Column (1),
we present interactions between the time trends and an indicator variable for whether
or not the patients local hospital market is located in a city, substituted for the measure
of market structure.23 The interaction term between the city indicator and our
post-policy trend is not significant and is approximately half as large as our main
Table 7
Additional Robustness Tests
Test of urban
effect
School competition
falsification test
Instrumental
variable estimate
2002–5 Trend 0.0025***
(0.0004)
0.0028***
(0.0004)
0.0030***
(0.0005)
2006–8 Trend 0.0004
(0.0007)
0.0003
(0.0008)
0.0017
(0.0010)
2002–5 Trend 
market structure
0.00034
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0011
(0.0006)
2006–8 Trend 
market structure
0.0007
(0.0008)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0031*
(0.0014)
Market structure – – 0.0107
(0.0261)
Patient characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 422,350 414,230 425,408
R2 0.126 0.126 0.105
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient
died within 30-days of their admission to hospital following an emergency AMI. Hospital characteristics:
Hospital type (foundation trust, teaching hospital or traditional acute hospital), number of AMIs treated at
the hospital per year. Patient characteristics: age, gender, Charlson comorbidity score, patient socioeconomic
status measured using the income component of the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivations at the output area.
Standard errors are clustered on GP-practices for the IV and falsification test. Standard errors are clustered on
hospitals for the hospital centred fixed-radius HHI. AMI, acute myocardial infarction; HHI, Herfindahl-
Hirschman Indexes.
23 Within our HES data, the area is defined as a city if the population within the hospitals output area is
greater than 10,000. We also estimated an interaction between our time trends and a London dummy and this
was also not significant.
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estimate. In Column (2), we present a placebo ⁄ falsification test in which we replace
hospital market structure with a measure of market structure amongst state secondary
schools. Clearly, if choice and competition in the health service drive our results, we
would not expect to see a significant impact from schooling structure on AMI mortality
rates in response to the NHS choice reforms. In contrast, if we are simply picking up
changes in mortality trends in dense versus less dense places, then the market structure
in schooling is just as likely to produce a false positive result. Reassuringly, the coef-
ficient on the interaction between post-reform trends and schooling structure is near
zero and insignificant.
The third column of Table 7 presents our instrumental variables estimates. We
instrument market structure using variation of the straight-line distance from each GP
to the nearest four elective providers, controlling for the distance to the patient’s
nearest provider. The F-tests on our instrumented variables are significant (p < 0.001)
with F-statistics of 207.32, 209.76 and 75.41, respectively for the 2002–5  market
structure term, the 2006–2008  market structure term and the baseline market structure.
In addition, the signs on the standard deviation coefficients in the first stage are
negative suggesting that higher standard deviations are associated with lower nlhhis.
The IV estimates show a similar pattern to the OLS results in Table 3. The point
estimate on our coefficient of interest is more than double that in the equivalent OLS
specification, although the standard errors are also higher and the Hausman test
indicates no statistically significant difference between the IV and OLS coefficient.
There is no evidence from the IV estimates that it is the endogeneity of market
structure to health service quality that drives our findings. Appendix D. includes the
first stage estimates from our IV estimator.
5. Conclusions
There has been significant debate over the potential for hospital competition to
improve hospital quality. This debate has been particularly intense in England, where
two successive UK governments have experimented with introducing hospital competi-
tion into the tax-funded English NHS. Previous experience with hospital competition
in England has not been positive. Looking at the 1990s internal market, Propper et al.
(2004, 2008) found that higher competition was associated with higher AMI mortality.
This is consistent with speculation that in markets where hospitals can compete on
price and quality, price is likely to decrease but so too is quality (Gaynor, 2004).
This article looks at the more recent wave of market-based reforms in the English
NHS. In the latest wave of reforms, patients were given the ability to select their
secondary care provider, prices were regulated by the UK Department of Health, and
hospitals could only compete on quality. We exploit the introduction of patient choice
in 2006 to determine whether increases in hospital competition in a market with fixed
prices led to improvements in hospital quality. Consistent with previous work exam-
ining the relationship between competition and quality, we measure hospital quality
using 30-day mortality from AMI.
In our analysis, we find that higher competition was associated with a faster decrease
in 30-day AMI mortality after the formal introduction of patient choice in January 2006.
Our results are robust to a number of specifications and definitions of market con-
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centration and consistent with our tests of the counterfactuals. The title of our article
asked whether or not hospital competition saved lives. Judging from the impact of the
reforms on 30-day AMI mortality, the reforms did save lives. Based on the results from
our preferred specification, we can provide an indicative estimate that the reforms
resulted in approximately 300 fewer deaths per year after the reforms were introduced
in 2006 (based on a mean nlhhi of 0.748, an average 70,000 AMI cases in each year, and
the coefficient in Table 3 Column (4): 70,000  4  0.0014  0.748). Crucially, this
estimates is for lives saved by reducing AMI mortality alone and ultimately, AMI mor-
tality only accounts for approximately 0.5% of total NHS hospital admissions. So, given
that we postulate that AMI mortality is correlated with quality across hospitals, in
practice, the lives saved from the reforms when estimated across the NHS and all
dimensions of service provision are likely to be significantly higher.
We posit that the improvements we observe in hospital quality were driven by
increases in competition for elective care. Competition in the elective market in
England likely prompted hospitals to take a number of steps to improve clinical
performance, such as undertaking clinical audits, tightening clinical governance,
making investments in new technology and improving hospital management. Those
improvements spurred on by elective competition likely resulted in across-the-board
improvements in hospital quality. These general quality improvements, we argue, are
likely captured by our chosen indicator of quality, 30-day AMI mortality, where there is
a close link between timely and effective medical interventions and patient survival
(Bradley et al., 2006; Jha et al., 2007).
Thus, our results suggest that, in contrast to what Propper et al. (2008) observed for
the 1990s internal market, competition in the current fixed price market did save lives.
These results are consistent with Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and
Geppert (2005) that were focused on hospital competition in the US and found that
hospital competition within a market with fixed prices led to an increase in hospital
quality, as indicated by a reduction in AMI mortality. Our results add support to current
efforts in England to increase the amount of publicly available information on quality
and promote hospital competition in the absence of price competition.
The conclusion, then, is that hospital competition, introduced in a fixed priced
market, can lead to an increase in the quality of hospital services, as economic
theory would predict. The rise in quality we have observed in the wake of the most
recent NHS reforms has undoubtedly increased consumer welfare. We postulate that
given the level of quality improvements that can be attributed to these reforms these
results are consistent with an overall improvement in social welfare. However, more
research needs to be carried out to evaluate this latter assertion empirically.
Appendix A: Bias Mitigation from Using Non-elective Outcomes When
Competition is Measured by Elective Procedures
The pervasive problem in studies of the effects of elective market structure on hospital quality is that
the measures of market structure are endogenous to quality in cross-sectional analysis. Our main
strategy in this article for solving this problem is to use the timing of the NHS reforms interacted with
2011] F251DO E S HO S P I T A L COM P E T I T I O N S A V E L I V E S ?
 2011 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
measures of market structure to provide an exogenous source of variation in competition over time.
We back this up with estimates based on market structure indices predicted from exogenous char-
acteristics (the Kessler and McClellan (2000) index) and instrumental variables based on dispersion
in GP-hospital distances. We also argue that using non-elective AMI procedure mortality as a
quality indicator mitigates (though does not eliminate) the potential bias from the endogeneity of
market structure indices to elective health care quality. Our reasoning is set out below.
The underlying parameter we would like to estimate is the causal effect of the market structure
for electives comp_e on latent hospital quality q. Note, by definition, choice is only operational for
electives, so it is only elective procedures that provide any quality incentives to hospitals. For
simplicity, assume that quality is influenced by elective market structure and by an exogenous
quality component u:
q ¼ b comp e þ u ðA:1Þ
There are possibly many potential measures of hospital quality q based on different procedures j.
Shock v_j captures idiosyncratic procedure-specific quality differences and v_j is assumed
uncorrelated with q and uncorrelated with v_k, for j 6¼ k:
q j ¼ q þ v j
so substituting in (A.1)
q j ¼ b comp e þ u þ v j
An inherent endogeneity issue arises in estimating this equation for elective procedures
q e ¼ b comp e þ u þ v e ðA:2Þ
The measured market structure comp_e is dependent partly on exogenous geographical factors
w, but also partly on patient choices in response to observed elective quality e.g.:
comp e ¼ c q e þ w ðA:3Þ
or in reduced form
comp e ¼ p ðu þ v eÞ þ n
where
p ¼ c=ð1 cbÞ and n ¼ w=ð1 cpÞ
So the bias in using elective procedures as a quality measure in (A.2) is:
cov½comp e; ðu þ v eÞ=varðcomp eÞ ¼ p varðu þ v eÞ=varðcomp eÞ
¼ p varðuÞ=varðcomp eÞ þ p varðv eÞ=varðcomp eÞ
Now, suppose we have an alternative measure of quality from non-elective AMI outcomes:
q a ¼ q þ v a
So what we estimate now is:
q a ¼ b comp e þ u þ v a
Now the bias is:
cov½comp e; ðu þ v aÞ=varðcomp eÞ ¼ p varðuÞ=varðcomp eÞ
< p varðuÞ=varðcomp eÞ þ p varðv eÞ=varðcomp eÞ
(as long as Var(v_e) > 0, and c > 0 in (A.3)).
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Put simply, the bias in using elective procedures includes an additional bias induced by people
choosing hospitals based on all dimensions of elective quality (general and idiosyncratic). For
AMIs, this bias is reduced since individuals do not generally have a choice over where they receive
care and the bias is only attributable to the components of AMI quality that are shared with
elective quality, not to the idiosyncratic part of elective quality.
Appendix B: Key Summary Statistics
Variable name Variable description Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Death_30 Death_30 is a binary indicator that
equals 1 if the patient died within
30-days of being admitted with
an AMI
0.1369 0.3437 0 1
Age Age is the age of the patient 71.4371 12.8655 40 99
Female Female is an indicator that equals 1
if the patients gender is female
0.3813 0.4857 0 1
IMD_Income_2007 IMD_Income_2007 is score of 1–5
based on the income component
of the 2007 index of multiple
deprivations.
3.1607 1.3982 1 6
Tradiditional_NHS* Traditional_NHS is an indicator that
equals 1 if the hospital where the
patient received care is not a
foundation trust or teaching hospital
0.7239 0.4471 0 1
Teaching* Teaching is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the hospital where the
patient is treated is a teaching
hospital
0.1458 0.3529 0 1
FT* FT is an indicator variable that equals
1 if the hospital where the patient is
treated is a foundation trust
0.1605 0.3671 0 1
Charlson_Score The Charlson comorbidity score is an
index ranging from 0 to 6, based on
the patients co-morbidities. Six is
the most severe.
1.7047 1.0543 0 12
Angioplasty Angioplasty is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the patient
underwent an angioplasty during
his ⁄ her admission
0.0543 0.2267 0 1
Negloghhi 30 km Negloghhi30 km is the negative log of
the HHI measured using a
fixed radius that is centred on each
GP practice and averaged across
2002 to 2005
1.4768 0.9186 0 3.6085
Negloghhi 30 band Negloghhi30band is the negative log
of the HHI measured using a
variable radius that is defined by the
30-min travel time surrounding each
GP practice and averaged across
2002 to 2005
1.2526 0.8141 0 3.2266
Negloghhi 95 Negloghhi95 is the negative log of the
HHI measured using a variable
radius that captures the 95th
percentile of travel for each GP
practice
0.7349 0.5561 0 3.728348
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Appendix B: (Continued)
Variable name Variable description Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Neglohhhi 20 Negloghhhi20 is the negative log of
the HHI measured using a fixed
radius of 20 km drawn around each
hospital and averaged across 2002 to
2005
1.0069 0.9292 0 3.3369
Log G_Count_30mins Log G_Count_30Band is the logged
count of hospitals within a variable
radius that captures a 30-min travel
time surrounding each GP practice
and averaged across 2002 to 2005
1.5651 0.8600 0.0000 3.4657
Log G_Count_30km Log G_Count_30 km is the logged
count of hospitals within a fixed
radius that extends 30 km around
each GP practice
1.7806 0.9723 0.0000 3.8501
Log G_Count_95sh Log G_Count_95 is the logged count
of the hospitals within a radius
defined by the distance that captures
the 95th percentile of travel for each
GP practice and averaged across 2002
to 2005
1.3985 0.7113 0.0000 3.7992
Distance Distance is the straight-line distance
that each patient travelled for care
measured in kilometres
13.3152 28.4493 0.0000 607.5968
Site Activity The number of heart attack patients
each hospital treats annually.
483.9835 233.7503 100 1,312
Notes. *The cumulative sum of Traditional NHS, FT and Teaching is greater than 1.00 because hospitals can
be both teaching hospitals and foundation trusts. Observations are limited to patients between 39 and
100 years of age with a length of stay greater than two days, treated at sites that treated more than 25 AMIs per
year. Unlike the regressions that we present, we do not limit the distance that patients travelled for care. AMI,
acute myocardial infarction; NHS, National Health Service; FT, foundation trust; HHI, Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man Indexes.
Appendix C: Least Squared Estimates of (1) with Competition Measured as the
Negative ln of the HHI Within a Market That Captures All Hospitals Within the
95th Percentile of each GPs Maximum Travel Distance
Coefficient Standard error
2002–2005 Trend 0.0024*** 0.0002
2006–2008 Trend 0.0014** 0.0004
2002–2005 Trend  nlhhi 0.0002 0.0002
2006–2008 Trend  nlhhi 0.0014** 0.0005
Negloghhi95 0.0014 0.0028
Female 0.0124*** 0.0012
Charlson2 0.0361*** 0.0013
Charlson3 0.0776*** 0.0021
Charlson4 0.1242*** 0.0034
Charlson5 0.1399*** 0.0055
Charlson6 0.1928*** 0.0071
IMD Income 2 0.0011 0.0018
IMD Income 3 0.0055* 0.0018
IMD Income 4 0.0046* 0.0019
IMD Income 5 0.0059* 0.0021
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Appendix C: (Continued)
Coefficient Standard error
Age 45–49 0.0016 0.0022
Age 50–54 0.0053* 0.0021
Age 55–59 0.0125*** 0.0021
Age 60–64 0.0263*** 0.0021
Age 65–69 0.0446*** 0.0022
Age 70–75 0.0741*** 0.0023
Age 75–79 0.1157*** 0.0023
Age 80–84 0.1539*** 0.0024
Age 85–89 0.1974*** 0.0027
Age 90+ 0.2564*** 0.0035
Teaching 0.0056 0.0123
FT 0.0050* 0.0022
Site Activity (150–300) 0.005 0.0037
Site Activity (300–450) 0.0180*** 0.0039
Site Activity (450 + ) 0.0254*** 0.0042
Distance 0.0008*** 0.0002
Angioplasty 0.0460*** 0.0023
February 0.0042 0.0026
March 0.0093*** 0.0025
April 0.0060* 0.0025
May 0.0100*** 0.0025
June 0.0120* 0.0025
July 0.0110*** 0.0025
August 0.0103*** 0.0026
September 0.0109*** 0.0026
October 0.0068** 0.0025
November 0.0044 0.0026
December 0.0025 0.0025
Tuesday 0.0062*** 0.0018
Wednesday 0.0000 0.0018
Thursday 0.0027 0.0018
Friday 0.0234*** 0.0017
Saturday 0.0910*** 0.0025
Sunday 0.2400*** 0.0035
North East  Year 0.0003 0.0001
Yorkshire and Humber  Year 0.0001 0.0001
North West  Year 0.0001* 0.0000
East Midlands  Year 0.0000 0.0000
West Midlands  Year 0.0000 0.0000
East of England  Year 0.0000 0.0001
South East Coast  Year 0.0000 0.0000
South Central  Year 0.0001 0.0001
South West  Year 0.0000 0.0000
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes
GP Fixed Effects Yes
N 422,350
R2 0.126
Notes. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient
died within 30-days of their admission to hospital. Standard errors are clustered on GP-practices. Reference
categories: Male, Charlson1, IMD-Income1, Age 40–44, Traditional NHS Trust, Site Activity (0–150), January,
London SHA. FT, foundation trust; HHI, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes; SHA, Strategic Health Authorities.
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AppendixD: First Stage of IVEstimate –DependentVariable: 2002–2005  nlhhi
Variable Coefficient Standard error
2002–2005 Trend 1.0261*** 0.0153
2006–2008 Trend 0.4037*** 0.0222
Female 0.0063 0.0183
Charlson 2 0.0061 0.0197
Charlson 3 0.0300 0.0295
Charlson 4 0.0376 0.0436
Charlson 5 0.0223 0.0734
Charlson 6 0.1546 0.0878
IMD Income Vector – 2 0.0018 0.0302
IMD Income Vector – 3 0.0029 0.0309
IMD Income Vector – 4 0.0044 0.0318
IMD Income Vector – 5 0.0374 0.0339
Age 45–49 0.0564 0.0725
Age 50–54 0.0259* 0.0676
Age 55–59 0.1098 0.0646
Age 60–64 0.0393 0.0628
Age 65–69 0.0669 0.0617
Age 70–74 0.0172 0.0629
Age 75–79 0.0222 0.0620
Age 80–84 0.0135 0.0615
Age 85–89 0.0046 0.0640
Age 90 + 0.0487 0.0681
Teaching Hospital 0.6379 0.3280
Foundation Trust 1.7376*** 0.1669
Angioplasty 0.0564 0.0729
Hospital Volume (150 AMIs – 299) 0.0381 0.1715
Hospital Volume (300 AMIs – 449) 0.2220 0.1899
Hospital Volume (450 AMIs +) 0.5298* 0.2155
Distance to Nearest Provider 0.0002 0.0001
Distance to Second Nearest Provider 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to Third Nearest Provider 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to Fourth Nearest Provider 0.0001*** 0.0000
February 0.0533 0.0366
March 0.0574 0.0356
April 0.0607 0.0375
May 0.0900* 0.0370
June 0.0003 0.0370
July 0.1184* 0.0391
August 0.0663 0.0398
September 0.1409*** 0.0396
October 0.2610*** 0.0419
November 0.2006*** 0.0413
December 0.2095*** 0.0406
North East  Year 0.0180 0.0125
Yorkshire and Humber  Year 0.0085 0.0066
North West  Year 0.0062 0.0042
East Midlands  Year 0.0028 0.0003
West Midlands  Year 0.0018 0.0006
East of England  Year 0.0004 0.0010
South East Cost  Year 0.0032 0.0004
South Central  Year 0.0042 0.0006
South West  Year 0.0039 0.0046
Tuesday 0.0478 0.0273
Wednesday 0.0637 0.0284
Thursday 0.0076 0.0269
Friday 0.0181 0.0266
Saturday 0.0034 0.0332
Sunday 0.0369 0.0414
F256 [ A U GU S TTH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
 2011 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
AppendixD:FirstStageoftheIVEstimates–DependentVariable:2006–2008  nlhhi
Variable Coefficient Standard error
2002–2005 Trend 0.0375*** 0.0025
2006–2008 Trend 1.0843*** 0.0120
Female 0.0048 0.0070
Charlson 2 0.0035 0.0073
Charlson 3 0.0094 0.0111
Charlson 4 0.0176 0.0166
Charlson 5 0.0084 0.0280
Charlson 6 0.0299 0.0344
IMD Income Vector – 2 0.0004 0.0114
IMD Income Vector – 3 0.0041 0.0116
IMD Income Vector – 4 0.0110 0.0118
IMD Income Vector – 5 0.0062 0.0123
Age 45–49 0.0040 0.0267
Age 50–54 0.0020 0.0249
Age 55–59 0.0345 0.0236
Age 60–64 0.0059 0.0231
Age 65–69 0.0076 0.0227
Age 70–74 0.0103 0.0229
Age 75–79 0.0015 0.0229
Age 80–84 0.0058 0.0224
Age 85–89 0.0124 0.0238
Age 90 + 0.0091 0.0258
Teaching Hospital 0.7666*** 0.1115
Foundation Trust 0.6250*** 0.0626
Angioplasty 0.0998** 0.0299
Hospital Volume (150 AMIs – 299) 0.3386*** 0.0681
Hospital Volume (300 AMIs – 449) 0.3902*** 0.0744
Hospital Volume (450 AMIs +) 0.0083 0.0821
Distance to Nearest Provider 0.0001 0.0000
Distance to Second Nearest Provider 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to Third Nearest Provider 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to Fourth Nearest Provider 0.0000*** 0.0000
February 0.0032 0.0120
March 0.0085 0.0117
April 0.0305* 0.0127
May 0.0095 0.0128
June 0.0275* 0.0126
July 0.0317 0.0140
August 0.0470** 0.0141
September 0.0246 0.0140
October 0.0287 0.0154
November 0.0560*** 0.0150
December 0.0587*** 0.0145
North East  Year 0.0089 0.0054
Yorkshire and Humber  Year 0.0048 0.0038
North West  Year 0.0018 0.0013
East Midlands  Year 0.0013 0.0001
West Midlands  Year 0.0012 0.0003
East of England  Year 0.0001 0.0003
South East Cost  Year 0.0015 0.0002
South Central  Year 0.0010 0.0002
South West  Year 0.0030 0.0030
Tuesday 0.0133 0.0106
Wednesday 0.0184 0.0107
Thursday 0.0003 0.0103
Friday 0.0014 0.0101
Saturday 0.0125 0.0128
Sunday 0.0121 0.0154
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Appendix D: First Stage of the IV Estimates – Dependent Variable: nlhhi
Variable Coefficient Standard error
2002–2005 Trend 0.0023** 0.0007
2006–2008 Trend 0.0173*** 0.0012
Female 0.0018 0.0010
Charlson 2 0.0020 0.0011
Charlson 3 0.0043* 0.0016
Charlson 4 0.0036 0.0023
Charlson 5 0.0022 0.0039
Charlson 6 0.0104* 0.0045
IMD Income Vector – 2 0.0006 0.0016
IMD Income Vector – 3 0.0000 0.0017
IMD Income Vector – 4 0.0025 0.0017
IMD Income Vector – 5 0.0028 0.0019
Age 45–49 0.0053 0.0040
Age 50–54 0.0022 0.0038
Age 55–59 0.0027 0.0037
Age 60–64 0.0012 0.0035
Age 65–69 0.0044 0.0035
Age 70–74 0.0019 0.0035
Age 75–79 0.0034 0.0035
Age 80–84 0.0030 0.0035
Age 85–89 0.0026 0.0035
Age 90 + 0.0044 0.0038
Teaching Hospital 0.0176 0.0252
Foundation Trust 0.0388* 0.0070
Angioplasty 0.0068 0.0033
Hospital Volume (150 AMIs – 299) 0.0018 0.0092
Hospital Volume (300 AMIs – 449) 0.0155 0.0103
Hospital Volume (450 AMIs +) 0.0126 0.0115
Distance to Nearest Provider 0.0000* 0.0000
Distance to Second Nearest Provider 0.0000*** 0.0000
Distance to Third Nearest Provider 0.0000 0.0000
Distance to Fourth Nearest Provider 0.0000*** 0.0000
February 0.0036 0.0021
March 0.0031 0.0021
April 0.0067 0.0022
May 0.0071 0.0021
June 0.0005 0.0021
July 0.0095*** 0.0022
August 0.0104*** 0.0022
September 0.0127*** 0.0023
October 0.0164*** 0.0023
November 0.0145*** 0.0023
December 0.0135*** 0.0023
North East  Year 0.0001 0.0004
Yorkshire and Humber  Year 0.0003 0.0003
North West  Year 0.0005 0.0003
East Midlands  Year 0.0000 0.0000
West Midlands  Year 0.0000 0.0000
East of England  Year 0.0001 0.0001
South East Cost  Year 0.0001*** 0.0000
South Central  Year 0.0000 0.0000
South West  Year 0.0004 0.0004
Tuesday 0.0012 0.0015
Wednesday 0.0011 0.0016
Thursday 0.0015 0.0015
Friday 0.0000 0.0015
Saturday 0.0006 0.0018
Sunday 0.0007 0.0023
Notes. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1%. *** Significant at 0.1%. Error terms are clustered on GP
practices.
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